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Research on avian cognitive neuroscience over the past two decades has revealed the avian brain to be a
better model for understanding human cognition than previously thought, despite differences in the neuro-
architecture of avian and mammalian brains. The brain, behavior, and cognition of songbirds have provided
an excellent model of human cognition in one domain, namely learning human language and the production
of speech. There are other important behavioral candidates of avian cognition, however, notably the capacity
of corvids to remember the past and plan for the future, as well as their ability to think about another’s
perspective, and physical reasoning. We review this work and assess the evidence that the corvid brain
can support such a cognitive architecture. We propose potential applications of these behavioral paradigms
for cognitive neuroscience, including recent work on single-cell recordings and neuroimaging in corvids.
Finally, we discuss their impact on understanding human developmental cognition.Introduction
Our understanding of the neural basis of cognition in humans
is limited to studying the human brain in action (cognitive neuro-
science) and how it is affected by trauma or disease (neuro-
psychology). However, there remain significant practical limita-
tions to studying the living human brain, especially in real-time
social interactions or during the solution of cognitive problems
that cannot be studied inside a scanner. Current techniques,
although much improved, are still dogged by issues of poor
spatial and temporal resolution, especially when compared to
techniques that can be used on animals. The only invasive
methods we have to study humans are disrupting neural function
using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS); recording from
neurons in clinical patients already suffering from a neural mal-
ady (and so running into problems in interpreting any findings),
or evaluating the effects of different drugs treatments based on
our understanding of brain chemistry. Therefore, we are still
dependent on using animal models for which we can manipulate
the brain directly.
Although many species are used as animal models to suc-
cessfully uncover the neural basis of cognition, we are res-
tricted in what questions can be asked about complex cogni-
tion, by which we mean reasoning, flexibility, problem solving,
prospection, and declarative knowledge (Emery and Clayton,
2004). Common laboratory animals that are used in neurosci-
ence—Drosophila, Aplysia, rats, mice, zebra finches, pigeons,
and monkeys have all provided important information about
the neurobiology of learning and cognition, but the extent to
which any of these animals can model the more unique aspects
of human cognition, such as mental time travel, theory of mind,
and innovative problem solving is limited. It is not our intention
here to go through detailed arguments for and against each of
these species’ merits or limitations in terms of their usefulness
as models of human cognition. Rather, we would like to propose1330 Neuron 86, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.an additional group of animals that has been relatively neglected
in studies of cognitive neuroscience, but which have arguably
demonstrated cognitive feats on a par with or even surpassing
those of the great apes. We propose the corvids (members of
the crow family) as (1) an animal model for human cognition
that could be adapted for studying the neural basis of complex
cognition, and (2) interesting subjects in their own right for under-
standing the evolution and neurobiology of cognition. Deter-
mining which features of the avian and mammalian brain play a
critical role in specific cognitive functions, and which ones are
unique, could dramatically increase our understanding of the
neural basis of cognition, and how and why these functions
have evolved.
Current primate models have revealed amazing insights into
the structure and function of the primate brain and its role in
perception, memory, attention, information processing, and de-
cision making. However, monkeys are expensive, the facilities
required to house them are difficult to set up, and there are
ethical issues concerning using subjects in great numbers. It is
not possible or indeed ethical to perform invasive experiments
on our closest relatives, the great apes. An alternative may be
to develop a model, not of the next closest species (which is a
rather unsatisfying compromise), but in an animal much more
distantly related to us, one which appears to demonstrate similar
cognitive abilities. In 2004, we proposed that the complex cogni-
tion of corvids and apes has evolved independently to solve
similar problems, such as coping with difficulties leading from
life in a complex social group full of individuals with different per-
sonalities and relationships, finding food distributed in both
space and time, and adapting to climatic and ecological chal-
lenges (Emery and Clayton, 2004). At the time, we suggested
that corvids and apes did this with very different brains, but as
we will discuss in the following section, this position has now
been updated as our understanding of the organization of the
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the mammalian brain than previously thought (Jarvis et al., 2005,
2013).
As yet, almost nothing is known about the structure and func-
tion of the corvid brain, whereas we have started to amass
convincing evidence for their sophisticated primate-like cogni-
tive abilities. So far, this is unsurpassed by other non-primates
and so makes corvids powerful candidates for making discov-
eries about the evolution and neural basis of complex cognition,
which could be applied to humans. We will discuss some of this
evidence later, as well as evaluating other avian and non-avian
models of cognition and why they are unlikely to be sufficient
for modeling the human mind. First, however, we shall assess
the evidence that bird brains, and most likely, corvid brains,
are capable of supporting a cognitive architecture similar to
that of the great apes and potentially humans.
Avian Brains
Our understanding of the structure and function of the avian brain
has changed dramatically since Edinger (1899) proposed that
birds were incapable of complex, structured thoughts because
he believed that their brains were composed primarily of regions
evolved from the striatum, rather than the cortex. This erroneous
view was rectified in 2004 when a consortium of avian neurosci-
entists using information from connectional, behavioral, neu-
ropharmacological, evolutionary, and developmental studies,
reported that the majority of the avian telencephalon was not
striatal but cortical in origin (Reiner et al., 2004; Jarvis et al.,
2005). A significant part of the avian telencephalon was derived
from the pallium of a stem amniote ancestor shared among all
mammals, reptiles, and birds. This evolved into the dorsal
ventricular ridge (DVR) and dorsal cortex (reptiles)/Wulst (birds)
and the cortex (mammals). Consequently, contrary to Edinger’s
view, little of the telencephalon of reptiles, birds, or mammals is
comprised of the striatum. In addition, studies on the role of the
basal ganglia (striatum) in skilledmotor learning, such as learning
song (Doupeet al., 2005), havedispelled the idea that the striatum
is primarily involved in instinctual or non-cognitive behavior. For
example, during song learning, the basal ganglia is essential for
modulating the response of motor circuits to changes in song
variability, such as due to changes in social context (Jarvis
et al., 1998; Hessler and Doupe, 1999). It remains to be seen
what role the striatum may play in other forms of skill learning,
such as learning to use a tool.
Reiner and the Avian Brain Nomenclature Consortium (Reiner
et al., 2004) agreed important changes to the names of avian
brain regions to reflect this updated knowledge, so that the
names of structures with the suffix -striatum (e.g., neostriatum)
were exchanged with terms ending in the suffix -pallium
(e.g., nidopallium) to reflect their shared ancestry with the
mammalian pallium (e.g., cortex) not the striatum (Figure 1A).
Prefix terms suggesting age, such as paleo-, archi-, and neo-
were also changed because birds are the more recently
evolved group compared to mammals, so the suggestion that
the avian brain regions were more ancestral was also in error.
Comparable structures in the primate (monkey) brain are de-
picted in Figure 1C (similarities are highlighted with the use of
the same colors).A recent comprehensive study comparing the expression of
behaviorally relevant genes across regions in the telencephalon
of eight bird species has led to a call to refine the avian brain
nomenclature further (Jarvis et al., 2013; see also Chen et al.,
2013). Areas within the mesopallium and hyperpallium (below
the lateral ventricle) were found to share a high percentage of
functionally expressed genes, and are proposed as a cohesive
structure (renamed the tertiary pallium). Jarvis and colleagues
(2013) therefore split the mesopallium into dorsal and ventral
sectors (Figure 1B). They also found that certain regions, such
as the entopallium and the hyperpallium intercalatum displayed
similar gene expression patterns and proposed that these struc-
tures should also be classified as a new structure (primary pal-
lium; Figure 1B). Other regions with mirrored patterns of gene
expression were the nidopallium and hyperpallium apicale,
which was renamed the secondary pallium (Figure 1B). Whether
these findings are sufficient enough for such changes to be
adopted by the avian neuroscience community remains to be
seen. The fact that a number of avian neuroanatomists, including
Harvey Karten (Karten et al., 2013) agree with such changes is
promising. However, it would seem premature to make such
sweeping changes on the basis of one study, no matter how
comprehensive. The original nomenclature changes were the
result of a group-level discussion (Reiner et al., 2004) and some-
thing similar will probably need to be reconvened in the future to
assess and confirm the validity of these proposed changes.
Although we now have a clearer picture of how the avian pal-
lium evolved, there still remains the fact that it appears to differ
significantly in structure and organization from the mammalian
cortex. The subdivisions of the stem amniote pallium (the com-
mon ancestor of all reptiles, birds, and mammals, most closely
resembling an amphibian) are divided into dorsal, medial, and
lateral portions, surrounding the DVR. The three divisions of
the dorsal pallium evolve into different structures in reptiles,
birds, and mammals and there is good evidence that they retain
similar functions. For example, the conventional view is that the
dorsal pallium, responsible primarily for processing sensory in-
formation - especially visual and somatosensory - evolves into
the dorsal cortex in reptiles, the Wulst (hyperpallium) in birds
and the neocortex in mammals (Striedter, 2005; but see Chen
et al., 2013; Jarvis et al., 2013 for an alternative view). The lateral
pallium evolves into the lateral cortex in reptiles, piriform cortex
in birds, and olfactory cortex in mammals and processes olfac-
tory information in all three taxa. Finally, the medial pallium
evolves into themedial cortex in reptiles, hippocampal formation
in birds and hippocampus in mammals and plays an important
role in navigation, including spatial memory (Salas et al., 2003).
The striking difference between birds and mammals is that there
is significant dorsalization of the pallium in mammals, with the
expansion of the cortex and significant ventralization of the pal-
lium in birds (and to a lesser extent reptiles), with the expansion
of the DVR. Despite these differences in evolutionary pathways,
the pallium of birds and mammals appear to be functionally
similar, if not equivalent.
In mammals, the cortex is constructed of six layers of
tightly packed cell bodies on the outer surface of the telenceph-
alon (gray matter). Connections within or between layers tend
to be short, with longer axons to other cortical regions andNeuron 86, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1331
Figure 1. Schematic Representations of Avian and Mammalian Brains
All images are sagittal views, with rostral to the right. Areas that are either structurally homologous or functionally analogous have been given the same color
(except D). In areas of the primate brain with hatching, it is not known which regions are functionally equivalent to the avian mesopallium, nidopallium, and
entopallium. These images are not to scale and the position of different regions are approximate and for illustrative purposes only.
(A) Crow brain with terms and subdivisions based on the revised nomenclature of Reiner et al., (2004). The area in the circle displays the subdivisions of the
hyperpallium in more detail.
(B) Crowbrain displaying proposed boundary changes based on Jarvis et al., (2013). The area in the circle displays the boundary and nomenclature changes in the
hyperpallium and mesopallium.
(C) Rhesus monkey brain with established nomenclature.
(D) Crow brain with overlaid functional columns (auditory [blue], day vision [red], motor [yellow], visual [green], somatosensory [orange], and cluster N [purple], as
proposed by Jarvis et al., 2013). HA, hyperpallium apicale; IHA, interstitial hyperpallium apicale; HI, hyperpallium intercalatum; HD, hyperpallium densocellulare;
H, hyperpallium; IH, intercalated hyperpallium; NCL, nidopallium caudolaterale.
1332 Neuron 86, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.
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Figure 2. Nuclear versus Layered
Organization
(A and B) The avian brain (A) and mammalian brain
(B) represented as 3D cubes to display the differ-
ences between a nuclear (avian) and layered
(mammalian) organization to the pallium and its
relationship to sub-pallial areas.
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cortex (Figure 2A). Deeper in the brain are subcortical structures,
such as the striatum, thalamus, hypothalamus, midbrain, and
brainstem influencing visceral functions and responses to
external stimuli. These areas are not laminated, but consist of
dense collections of nuclei with short connections within and be-
tween nuclei and back to the cortex. In birds, the majority of the
pallium is organized into nuclei, with no significant tracts of un-
derlying white matter and no significant lamination. The only
possible exception is the Wulst that appears to be laminated in
all birds (but is especially pronounced in owls), but this appear-
ance is likely the result of stretching and squashing of the hyper-
pallial nuclei into something akin to layers (Figure 2B).
Although the overall organization of mammalian and avian
brains is quite different, connections of sensory systems, such
as visual, somatosensory, and auditory, as well as themotor sys-
tem within each taxon possess many similarities (Medina and
Reiner, 2000; but again see Jarvis et al., 2013 for an alternative
view). For example, in birds and primates there are three main vi-
sual processing pathways. First, the lemnothalamic or thalamo-
fugal pathway transfers visual information from the retina to the
thalamus (principle optic nuclei in birds; dorsal portion of the
lateral geniculate nucleus in primates), then projects to the pri-
mary visual processing areas (Wulst in birds; V1 or striate cortex
in primates). Second, the collothalamic or tectofugal pathway
transfers visual information from the retina to the optic tectum
(birds) or superior colliculus (primates), then projects to the thal-
amus (nucleus rotundus in birds; pulvinar and lateral posterior
nucleus in primates) and finally the secondary visual processing
areas (entopallium in birds; extrastriate cortex in primates). Third,
the accessory optic system is involved in stabilizing retinal im-
ages during self-motion, which is particularly important for birds
moving rapidly through a complex 3D world. An additional, rela-
tively minor centrifugal pathway, projects back to the retina from
regions in the brainstem and its role remains unclear. It may play
a role in visual reflexes and modulating gaze sensitivity, espe-
cially during foraging on the ground, but it is not assumed to
function in visual cognition (Miceli et al., 1999; Shimizu and Wa-
tanabe, 2012).Neuron 8Although the anatomical connections
of each pathway are structurally homolo-
gous across birds and primates, there is
some disagreement over whether their
functions are shared. The tectofugal
pathway is dominant in birds, whereas
the thalamofugal pathway is dominant in
primates (Shimizu et al., 2010). Lesions
of the avian thalamofugal pathway only
cause minor deficits in visual processing(especially in birds with lateral eyes), whereas lesions of the pri-
mate thalamofugal pathway cause severe visual deficits, which
can result in blindness (Brown and Schafer, 1888). However,
despite differences in connectivity, with no shared common her-
itage, the avian tectofugal pathway and primate thalamofugal
pathway share functions in processing color and motion infor-
mation and are subdivided along functional lines (e.g., Nguyen
et al., 2004). As such, these functional similarities are likely to
have evolved independently. Similar convergences in sensory
pathways occur in the auditory, somatosensory, and motor sys-
tems of birds andmammals (Medina and Reiner, 2000), suggest-
ing that other convergent pathways related to cognitionmay also
exist in birds and mammals.
In the mammalian brain, regions with similar functions tend to
be found clustered together, forming functional columns in the
cortex. Their close proximity probably relates to an increased
efficiency in neural wiring. Recent studies have found similar
functional columns for a single modality or behavior in the avian
brain (Wang et al., 2010; Kingsbury et al., 2011). By studying the
expression of a suite of behaviorally relevant genes in response
to different stimuli, Jarvis and colleagues (2013) demonstrated
the equivalent of functional columns in the songbird brain
that spanned pallial, striatal, and even pallidal structures
(Figure 1D). They found clusters of neurons that expressed the
same functionally relevant genes responsive to auditory, so-
matosensory, and visual (day and night vision) stimuli, as well
as motor responses and a final cluster of the same gene expres-
sion, but with an unknown function. As with the proposed
changes in nomenclature, we share the concerns of Montiel
andMolna´r (2013) that it would seem premature to suggest addi-
tional name changes based on similarities in gene expression
profiles at this early stage, based on a single study.
What this study does tell us though, is that the nucleated avian
brain may be more efficiently organized, along the lines of the
mammalian cortex, than previously assumed. An analysis of
the connectivity patterns of regions in the pigeon brain (Shana-
han et al., 2013) concur with Jarvis and colleagues (2013) that
the avian brain is organized using similar principles to the
mammalian brain. Regions with a similar function share patterns6, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1333
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tions are collected into hub nodes, through which the majority of
neural information passes. A similar connectional organization
was found for the primate brain (Young, 1993).
Of direct relevance to the issue of complex cognition is
whether birds possess a region that is functionally equivalent
to the primate prefrontal cortex (PFC). As we will describe in a
later section, some corvids are capable of mental feats that
have only so far been described in our closest relatives, the great
apes. Although comparable neural studies have yet to be per-
formed on apes or corvids, we know from human neuroimaging
that retrospective and prospective memory, theory of mind, and
insightful problem solving all depend on the medial PFC,
whereas executive functions are dependent on the dorsolateral
PFC, and reward learning and emotional engagement are
dependent on the orbital PFC (Fuster, 2001). The nidopallium
caudolaterale (NCL) has been proposed as the equivalent to
the entire primate PFC based on its connectivity, development,
electrophysiology, role in behavior, and neurochemistry (Gu¨ntu¨r-
ku¨n, 2005). We do not have the space to discuss these studies in
the detail they deserve, but will briefly describe those that are the
most pertinent.
First, NCL forms reciprocal connections with both primary
and secondary/tertiary areas in the hyperpallium, mesopallium,
and entopallium. It sends projections to the striatum influencing
behavioral responses. It also receives and projects connections
to and from motor and limbic areas. The NCL is therefore in a
central position to receive information, process that information
and then send it on to effect behavior (Gu¨ntu¨rku¨n, 2005). This is
parallel to what occurs in the primate PFC. Second, lesions of
the NCL have dramatic effects on a series of executive function
tasks, such as working memory, reversal learning, and inhibi-
tory control (Mogensen and Divac, 1993). Third, the NCL
receives dopamine efferent fibers from the ventral tegmental
area and substantia nigra in the midbrain. The NCL is densely
populated with dopamine (D1 and D2) receptors, it sends
dopamine-rich projections to the striatum and blockade of D1
receptors affects working memory and discrimination reversal
task performance (Durstewitz et al., 1999). Finally, NCL neurons
in working memory tasks display their strongest responses in
the delay period, coding an expectation of reward (Rose and
Colombo, 2005).
Pigeons are the subject of many studies on avian brain struc-
ture and function (those not focused on song learning). Pigeons
are proficient learners and exceptional at visual discrimination,
but there is little evidence for complex cognition (e.g., theory of
mind, mental time travel, self-awareness, and reasoning). The
fact that pigeons have a brain region functionally equivalent to
the primate PFC means either that pigeons are smarter than
we previously thought (but yet to be demonstrated experimen-
tally), or that executive functions are not as complex as previ-
ously thought, or that the pigeon NCL is equivalent to only part
of the PFC complex; a region that maybe only plays a supporting
role in more complex forms of cognition. We suggest that the
pigeon NCLmay be functionally equivalent to the primate dorso-
lateral PFC, playing a role in executive functions, and that the
pigeon NCL may also share some functions with primate orbital
PFC due to its multisensory connectivity, its role in reward1334 Neuron 86, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.learning, and its extensive distribution of dopamine receptors
(Gu¨ntu¨rku¨n, 2005); however, because this role has yet to be
investigated, we cannot comment on this further. We do not
know whether pigeons have an equivalent region to the medial
PFC, but feel it unlikely as this region in primates supports com-
plex cognition that is absent in pigeons. However, we predict
that corvids could have evolved a similar region due to their skills
in these areas (see below).
Unlike most mammals other than humans, the songbirds
(Oscines), of which corvids are included, are excellent vocal
learners and we now know a lot about the behavioral processes
that underlie avian song perception and production including
when and how the songs are learned and from whom, as well
as the neural circuitry controlling these processes. The avian
vocal learning system has therefore been proposed as an excel-
lent model for human speech and language (see Bolhuis et al.,
2010, Brainard and Doupe, 2013; Petkov and Jarvis, 2012 for
recent reviews). A recent proposal suggested that parrots may
be a better model than songbirds because of their ability to
imitate human speech, and the form of their complex social rela-
tionships (Colbert-White et al., 2014); however, this proposal
fails to appreciate that corvids are songbirds that can imitate hu-
man speech and also have complex social relationships (Emery,
2006).
Complex cognition is not a universal trait across non-human
animals. We have proposed that selective animal groups with a
very specific socio-ecology, life history, and sophisticated neural
systems are capable of general cognitive abilities as opposed to
only those that have evolved to face specific challenges in their
day-to-day lives (van Horik et al., 2012). Corvids and apes are
two of those groups and their cognitive abilities are suggested
to have arisen through convergent evolution not common
descent. By this, we mean that not all related species from
the common stem amniote ancestor of birds and mammals
(including all reptiles) possess the same abilities as those in the
corvid and ape families (Emery and Clayton, 2004). We are well
aware that our argument for convergence as opposed to homol-
ogy is based on a paucity of data from a select few avian and
mammalian species and that more comparative studies need
to be conducted. We suspect that similarities in cognition will
also be found in parrots, dolphins, and elephants, for example,
and that as with the corvids and apes, these are most likely to
have evolved convergently because they all share a number of
biological, ecological, and psychological traits related to com-
plex cognition, including vocal learning (Petkov and Jarvis,
2012; van Horik et al., 2012). A case in point is object perma-
nence, particularly the ability to track invisible displacements
(Piagetian Stage 6), which only seems to be present in corvids,
(Hoffmann et al., 2011; Zucca et al., 2007), parrots (Auersperg
et al., 2014) and apes (e.g., Collier-Baker et al., 2006; however
see Jaakkola, 2014 for an alternative account).
Corvids and apes differ from most other animal groups in that
they share a suite of cognitive abilities that allow them to deal
with their social and physical worlds (Emery and Clayton,
2004). We proposed four cognitive tools that would allow these
two groups to solve problems outside their natural domains,
namely causal reasoning, flexibility, prospection, and imagi-
nation. These tools are not mutually exclusive, for example,
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causal reasoning, and together they make possible the solution
of novel problems. In the 10 years since we proposed this cog-
nitive toolkit, evidence that corvids and apes possess these
tools has proliferated. As such, our discussion of these abilities
in corvids will largely be restricted, because of space, to our
studies.
Avian Models of Learning and Cognition
Birds have been used as models for learning and memory and
the neural basis of cognition for decades (Emery, 2006). Indeed,
some species are considered the best models currently avail-
able. Three main species or groups of birds are currently used
to address specific aspects of learning and cognition and their
neurobiology: pigeons, domestic chicks, and songbirds.
Pigeons are the primary model system for understanding the
processes of learning and spatial memory, in particular visual
discrimination and navigation (homing). Studies on pigeons
have substantially increased our knowledge of avian brain con-
nectivity, including the suggestion of an avian equivalent to the
mammalian prefrontal cortex (Gu¨ntu¨rku¨n et al., 2014). Studies
of the avian hippocampus have been instrumental in our under-
standing of the neural mechanisms of spatial navigation and
homing behavior (Bingman et al., 2005)
Domestic chicks are the primary model for studying the devel-
opment and neurobiology of learning and memory, especially
using imprinting as a model behavior system (Nakamori et al.,
2013). Chicks are also used as models for cerebral lateralization
and behavioral function (Halpern et al., 2005). Studies on space,
number, social, and physical cognition in chicks have revealed
striking abilities in very young brains (Vallortigara, 2012).
Songbirds are the primary model for studying the processes
underlying vocal learning and the avian song control system is
one of the best-known systems for understanding the neural ba-
sis of learning and memory (Ziegler and Marler, 2012). Although
all passerines (songbirds) sing, zebra finches have become the
most popular model, and our knowledge of their neuroanatomy
and behavior is unsurpassed (Mello, 2014). A second songbird,
the black-capped chickadee is a model species for testing ideas
concerning the neurobiology of spatial memory and its interac-
tion with hormones, caching behavior, and environmental stress
(Pravosudov, 2007).
Although all three models have advanced our understanding
of the neurobiology and evolution of cognition in a taxon that
has a very different brain architecture and shows vast differ-
ences in behavior, there are limitations in the application of these
models to some aspects of human cognition, namely what we
call complex cognition (Emery and Clayton, 2004). Recent
work in corvids has revealed abilities in areas that have been
proposed as uniquely human and not yet displayed in these
other avian models and this is the main reason for our proposal
for a corvid cognitive neuroscience and application of corvids
as models of human cognition.
Potential Behavioral Candidates for Understanding
Human Cognition
The vocal learning system of songbirds is not the only avian
model for understanding human cognition. For almost 20 years,evidence has accumulated suggesting that corvids have remark-
able cognitive capacities, possessing feats that a number of re-
searchers regard to be uniquely human. Corvids are therefore
potential candidates for new animal models of human cognition.
Three strands of evidence will be considered in this review:
mental time travel (remembering the past and planning for the
future), social cognition, and physical problem solving. We will
review the research on these three aspects of cognition in cor-
vids, and discuss how the same paradigms can be developed
to study human cognition, particularly the application to neuro-
science and developmental cognition (Figure 3). Comparative
and developmental cognition both require the use of tasks that
are, respectively, entirely or largely, non-verbal. It is important
to note, however, that our purpose is not to ask questions about
whether corvids show cognitive performances equivalent to hu-
mans, or of young humans of a particular age. Rather, the objec-
tive is to investigate two different kinds of mind, ones that have
very different evolutionary histories and neural architectures
yet similar patterns of large-scale network organization as dis-
cussed in the previous section, in order to compare and contrast
the mechanisms they use to solve the tasks. This raises inter-
esting questions about how information processing is achieved
in these two kinds of mind given the striking differences in neural
architecture and surprising similarities in connectivity and orga-
nization of avian and mammalian brains, particularly how the
information is passed between nuclei in the avian brain as
opposed to between layers in the mammalian cortex.
Mental Time Travel
Mental time travel refers to the ability to remember the past
(episodic memory) and plan for the future (episodic future
thinking). There has been considerable debate as to whether
mental time travel is uniquely human (e.g., Suddendorf and Cor-
ballis, 1997), or whether we share this cognitive ability with other
animals (e.g., Clayton et al., 2003). As we alluded to in the previ-
ous section, one difficulty is that mental time travel in humans
has typically been characterized in terms of two features of
phenomenological consciousness, neither of which is amenable
to empirical evaluation in animals. The first feature is an aware-
ness of the subjective sense of time, of re-experiencing now
in the mind’s eye an event that happened in the past and of
pre-experiencing possible future scenarios; the second is an
awareness of being the owner and author of these memories
and forethoughts (e.g., Tulving, 2005).
In the absence of any agreed behavioral markers of con-
sciousness in non-linguistic animals, it is not possible to evaluate
empirically whether or not the phenomenological aspects of
mental time travel are unique to humans. What we can do
is focus on the behavioral criteria for episodic cognition, and
this has been termed episodic-like cognition to explicitly
acknowledge that such criteria ignore the involvement of
phenomenological consciousness (Clayton and Dickinson,
1998). The retrospective component, episodic-like memory,
needs to fulfill three criteria to meet the behavioral properties
of episodic memory as defined for humans: namely content,
structure, and flexibility (Clayton et al., 2003). In terms of the con-
tent of an episodic-like memory, the subject must remember
what happened where and when based on a single past experi-
ence. Second, the what-where-and-when components form anNeuron 86, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1335
Figure 3. Different Corvid Cognition Tasks
(A) Caching paradigm used to test episodic-like
memory (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998) and future
planning (Raby et al., 2007) in western scrub jays.
Two different foods (e.g., wax worms and meal-
worms) can be hidden in different locations
(molds) in an ice cube tray and recovered after
different delay periods. The trays are filled with
sand or corn kibble, allowing the foods to be
buried and each tray is made unique by the
arrangement of various colored Lego Duplo bricks
around each tray.
(B) Object choice paradigm used to test social
cognition in jackdaws (von Bayern and Emery,
2009a, 2009b).
(C) Social caching paradigm used to test for visual
perspective taking, knowledge attribution, and
experience projection in western scrub jays (Em-
ery and Clayton, 2001, Clayton et al., 2007).
(D) Tube-and-bucket paradigm used to test
physical cognition and tool manufacture in rooks
(Bird and Emery, 2009a).
(E) Aesop’s Fable (water displacement) task used
to test physical cognition and tool use in rooks
(Bird and Emery, 2009b).
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discriminate between similar episodes that occurred at different
times and places. Finally, the information must be capable of
flexible deployment, and as a result, it can be updated after
the memory has been formed so that information can be gener-
alized across situations.
Experiments on the caching behavior of western scrub-jays
(Figure 3A) revealed that these birds episodically recall specific
past caching episodes in terms of what happened where and
when; i.e., they remember which foods they have hidden where
and how long ago and search in places they had cached perish-
able worms after a short delay when they would still be fresh
but switching to search in the peanut cache sites after a long
delay when the worms would have rotted (Clayton and Dickin-
son, 1998). Subsequent tests have shown that the jays also
remember which type of perishable foods they have hidden
where and how long ago (e.g., worms versus crickets), irrespec-1336 Neuron 86, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.tive of whether the foods had ripened or
decayed. The jays also discriminated be-
tween similar episodes that occurred at
different times and in different places,
demonstrating that they formed inte-
grated what-where-and-when memories.
Furthermore, if the jays were given new
information about how long a given food
item takes to degrade in a particular
place, but only after the caching event
had taken place, then they could update
their knowledge about the rate of perish-
ability of the food and change their search
behavior at recovery accordingly. As far
aswe are aware, this is the only published
demonstration of the declarative flexi-
bility with which animals can update their
information after the time of memory en-
coding (Clayton et al., 2003).Since the initial studies, a number of other laboratories have
investigated whether animals have episodic-like memory using
paradigms analogous to those used with the jays. There is now
good evidence that a diverse range of animals can remember
the what-where-and-when of past events including rats (Babb
and Crystal, 2006), mice (Dere et al., 2005), magpies (Zinkivskay
et al., 2009), and chickadees (Feeney et al., 2009), and more
recently chimpanzees (Martin-Ordas et al., 2010) and cuttlefish
(Jozet-Alves et al., 2013). Note that all of these studies have
only focused on the content of episodic-like memory: they lack
the cognitive sophistication to demonstrate that such memories
have an integrated or bound structure, and can be deployed flex-
ibly. For this reason, the scrub-jay paradigm remains the most
appropriate model for application to models of human episodic
cognition.
If what-where-and-when memories are an indicator of epi-
sodic cognition, then the animals that pass such tasks should
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to support this claim in corvids. It has been shown, for example,
that scrub-jays plan for tomorrow’s breakfast without reference
to their current motivational state, spontaneously caching in
the evening in a room where they have learned they will never
be served food in the morning (Raby et al., 2007). It is important
to note that we can rule out an explanation in terms of mediated
reinforcement of the anticipatory act because the birds were not
given the opportunity to cache during training. Indeed, Shettle-
worth has argued that ‘‘two requirements for genuine future plan-
ning are that the behavior involved should be a novel action or
combination of actions. and that it should be appropriate to a
motivational state other than the one the animal is in at that mo-
ment.Raby et al. describe the first observations that unambig-
uously fulfill both requirements’’ (Shettleworth, 2007, p. 825).
These results show that corvids are capable of both episodic-
like memory and planning for breakfast.
Social Cognition
Corvids are highly visual animals and use social signals such as
eye gaze and gestures, such as beak direction, to represent their
attentional state (Pika and Bugnyar, 2011). The ability to read
such signals presents individuals with an advantage in social
interactions, possibly allowing them to predict another’s future
actions and so outwit them. In the next section, we will discuss
this ability in relation to caching and specifically cache protec-
tion; however, corvids also interact outside of caching, espe-
cially with close companions and social partners. Jackdaws,
for example, follow a conspecific’s gaze toward the object of
their attention concealing food, but only when the conspecific
is their partner, not when unfamiliar to them (Figure 3B; von
Bayern and Emery, 2009b). In a similar paradigm using human
cues, jackdaws responded to social signals that were communi-
cative (distal pointing and gaze alternation), not ambiguous or
potentially threatening (von Bayern and Emery, 2009a). Finally,
in a study of understanding other’s attentional states—using a
competitive paradigm where a human looked toward or away
from food and the time taken for the bird to take the food was re-
corded—jackdaws took longer to take the food if the human was
a stranger and their attention was focused on the food. If the hu-
man was familiar to them, they did not discriminate between
attentional states (von Bayern and Emery, 2009a).
In these cases, jackdaws demonstrate a high level of flexibility
in the way that they differentiate between similar social cues that
differ in functional significance. They note the identity of the indi-
vidual providing the cue and act accordingly; either using the
honest or reliable cue of a partner in a cooperative paradigm or
responding to the threat of a human stranger in a competitive
paradigm. They also rely on communicative cues in a coopera-
tive task, not attentional cues that could be misinterpreted in
the same context. Finally, they also generalize their responses
to social cues based on their function, not appearance, so act
similarly to one eye open, two eyes open and profile directed
away but with eyes toward the viewer, all representing the
same attentional state.
Cache Protection Strategies
Much of the work on social cognition in corvids, however, re-
volves around the strategies these birds use to protect their
caches from being stolen (pilfered) by other individuals. Mostfood-caching animals only steal caches at the time they are be-
ing hidden, or when discovered opportunistically. Corvids, in
contrast, can remember where they have seen other individuals
cache based on observation alone, and can therefore steal the
food at a later date once the cacher is no longer present to
defend its caches (Figure 3C; reviewed by Clayton et al.,
2007). This dramatically increases the risk of cache theft. An
added complexity is that any one corvid may play the role of
both cache protector and potential pilferer, and this role-playing
may have driven the evolution of increasingly more complex
cognitive strategies for pilfering and cache protection (e.g., de
Kort and Clayton, 2006)
Corvids use a suite of cache-protection strategies that limit op-
portunities for potential pilferers to witness caching events: they
preferentially cache behind barriers when others are looking, and
use both distance and shade to degrade the visual information
available to onlookers, preferences they do not show when
others cannot see where they cache. If the potential pilferer can
hear but cannot see, they conceal auditory information by cach-
ing in a substrate that makes little noise. In contrast, if they are
alone or if others can see as well as hear the caching event,
then thebirdsprefer to cache in noisy substrates. It hasbeensug-
gested that this may serve as a cache protection strategy in its
own right, allowing the cacher to detect a potential cache-raid
should the bird bewithin earshot of a potential pilferer that it is un-
able to see. Jays also keep track of which particular individual
bird watched them cache and when, and take protective action
accordingly, such as moving the high-risk caches to new places
once the potential pilferer has left. In deciding which cache pro-
tection tactics to use, the birds take into account the dominance
status of the potential pilferer in relation to their own dominance
status, using different strategies if they are dominant to the
onlooker than if they are subordinate (reviewed by Clayton
et al., 2007). Similar tactics have been found in several other spe-
cies of corvids, in both the laboratory and the field, including ra-
vens (e.g., Bugnyar, 2011), Clark’s nutcrackers (Clary and Kelly,
2011), Florida scrub-jays (Kulahci and Bowman, 2011), and
Eurasian jays (e.g., LeggandClayton, 2014) andalso in somepar-
ids, namely mountain chickadees (Pravosudov, 2008).
Experience Projection
The most striking finding is that only those birds who have been
experienced thieves themselves in the past move food to new
cache sites once the potential pilferer has left the scene (Emery
and Clayton, 2001). Naive birds that have not stolen other birds’
caches do not do so, ruling out the possibility that such cache
protection strategies are hard wired. It is important to note that
the jays were neither rewarded nor punished for re-caching,
and in fact, they were not given the opportunity to recover their
re-caches and thus discover whether re-caching was success-
ful, and thus had no opportunity to learn about the benefits
of re-caching. Instead, the inference is that the experienced pil-
ferers engage in a form of social cognition called experience
projection, anticipating what the onlooker might do in similar cir-
cumstances; i.e., to pilfer the caches they have seen another bird
make, and thus move their caches to new places before the
potential pilferer has the opportunity to do so. In terms of their
applicability as an animal model of social cognition that can be
developed for humans, there are two important things to note.Neuron 86, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1337
Neuron
PerspectiveThe first is that the responses of these experienced birds are
highly flexible. The jays only re-cache food when a potential
pilferer has observed them cache the food; they do not do so if
the onlooker was their mate with whom they share their caches
or if the potential thief did not witness the caching event (Emery
andClayton, 2001). The second is that this flexible deployment of
information that we referred to in the previous section is seen in
both studies of episodic cognition and social cognition, which is
consistent with the human neuroimaging studies that suggest
that mental time travel, theory of mind, and insightful problem
solving are all dependent on the PFC (Emery and Clayton, 2004).
Physical Problem Solving
The final strand of evidence for corvid cognitive capacities
comes from studies of physical problem solving, and in particular
research on innovative tool use. The most famous example is
that of Betty, a New Caledonian crow, who modified a piece of
wire to make a hook-shaped tool, which was used to retrieve a
small bucket containing a reward that was otherwise out of
beak reach (Weir et al., 2002). Even more striking is the finding
that rooks, which do not habitually use tools in thewild, will spon-
taneously craft these hooked shape tools in the laboratory and
use them to obtain food (Figure 3D; Bird and Emery, 2009a).
A task that has the greater potential for application across spe-
cies is the Water Displacement Task inspired by Aesop’s fable
‘‘The Crow and The Pitcher.’’ In this tale, a thirsty crow drops
stones into a half-full pitcher of water to raise the level within
beak reach so that it can drink. In the Water Displacement or Ae-
sop’s Fable task, rather thanmaking the birds thirsty, the corvids
were tempted with a worm floating on top of water half-filled in a
vertical transparent tube (Figure 3E). A handful of stones were
placed next to the tube, which the bird had to drop into the
tube to raise the water level and reach the worm. Bird and Emery
(2009b) found that rooks with experience of dropping stones into
tubes, but not in the context of water, would spontaneously put
the stones into the tube to raise the water level and obtain the
worm. Furthermore, when the water level was varied, the birds
matched the number of stones required to increase the water
level and so reach theworm. The birdswere also selective in their
choice of stones, taking those that would most efficiently raise
the water level. Subsequent experiments have shown that
Eurasian jays can solve this task (Cheke et al., 2011), and that
habitual tool-using New Caledonian crows showed a similar per-
formance to that of rooks and Eurasian jays (Jelbert et al., 2014).
In these latter studies, jays and crows flexibly responded to
changes in the material of the ‘‘stones’’ (floatable or sinkable),
as well as the substrate inside the tube (sand, sawdust, air or
water), but did not manipulate the water when they could only
see the result of their actions, not the actions themselves.
Costs and Benefits of the Different Animal Models
Why develop corvid models of human cognition when there
already exist a number of rodent and non-corvid avian models
that may be more amenable to neuroscientific investigation?
We know significantly more about the rodent brain than the cor-
vid brain, rodent genomes have been mapped in detail and gene
knockouts have been used to model human neurocognitive dis-
orders. Rodents are relatively simple and cheap to maintain in
the lab, easy to obtain and we know a lot about their biology1338 Neuron 86, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.and behavior. Similar cognitive tasks to those described for cor-
vids have been developed for rats. For example, Babb and Crys-
tal (2006) found that rats could remember where different types
of food (what) were located in a radial arm maze and the relative
time when they were available (when). It is important to note,
however, that more stringent tests of flexibility and whether
these individual components are bound together as an inte-
grated representation remain an open question, having only
been conducted on the corvids (see Clayton et al., 2003).
Furthermore, the corvid models have the advantage of showing
flexibility across all three domains, namely mental time travel,
theory of mind, and causal reasoning.
With any animal model, there are pros and cons. A disadvan-
tage of the rodent models is that rodents are primarily olfactory
creatures, whereas corvids, like humans, are visual and auditory
creatures. Indeed avian and primate brains have analogous
visual and auditory pathways (Medina and Reiner, 2000). Many
examples of non-verbal human social cognition are based on
visual cues, such as pointing and eye gaze, and only non-human
animals that can use those cues in their social interactions are
relevant potential animal models of human social cognition (Em-
ery and Clayton, 2009). Those few rodent species that either
naturally use tools or have been trained to use tools (e.g., Oka-
noya et al., 2008) do not use tools in the same flexible manner
as humans or corvids. Rodents are also inadequate models of
human cognitive aging because they only live for approximately
1 year in captivity, whereas corvids can live up to 30 years.
However, corvid models of human cognition are not without
their problems. Corvids are not traditional lab animals so they
cannot be ordered from a lab breeder enmass but must be taken
from the wild or hand-raised if they are to be studied in the lab,
and this requires specialist technical assistance. To date, only
one stereotaxic atlas of a corvid brain has been published (jungle
crow; Izawa and Watanabe, 2007) and very little is known about
neural connectivity or genome structure. In essence, the corvids
make excellent behavioral models of cognition provided the
space and expertise for their housing is available, but they
remain to be developed as neurobiological models.
Potential Applications of the Corvid Models
The biological and cognitive similarities of corvids and humans
reinforce our proposal that corvids represent strong models
for some aspects of human cognition. Although avian brains
are structured along very different principles from mammalian
brains, we suggest that these differences are not a barrier to sim-
ilarities in function. Although our earlier proposal suggested a
significant degree of convergence in the cognitive systems of
non-human apes and corvids (Emery and Clayton, 2004), we
might now extend that proposal to include humans (albeit with
clear warnings that many important differences still exist). Our
proposal is not that corvids present perfect models of human
behavior and cognition, rather that they are as good, if not better
than current non-human mammalian models. We propose two
applications of corvid models of human cognition: neuroscience
and child development.
Neuroscience
Avian neuroscience has largely focused on two aspects of
behavior: song learning and spatial memory. Research on
Neuron
Perspectivesong learning has revealed selective neural circuits for per-
ceiving song, circuits matching perceived song with remem-
bered song, and circuits for producing song in specific
contexts (Ziegler and Marler, 2012). Research on spatial
memory has focused on the hippocampus; size differences
in the hippocampus between caching and non-caching birds
and changes in hippocampus size before and after caching,
as well as neurogenesis in the hippocampus (Pravosudov,
2007). This research on the interplay between brain and
behavior has been largely restricted to traditional avian
models, such as the zebra finch (song) and the chickadee
(caching). In contrast, there has been little research on the cor-
vid brain. We shall focus on two studies that have direct
relevance to our cognitive models and which have the greatest
potential for further development.
The first concerns the role of the NCL in corvids. Although
there is good evidence that the NCL of birds is functionally equiv-
alent to the primate PFC, much of this research is the result of
studies performed on pigeons. Corvids have a much larger cere-
brum than most other birds (Emery and Clayton, 2004) and this
dramatic increase in brain size in corvids is reflected in a larger
nidopallium and thus larger NCL (Rehka¨mper et al., 1991).
Furthermore, studies comparing the performance of corvids
and pigeons on learning sets showed that pigeons were rote
learners, solving each set of visual discriminations afresh,
whereas the corvids were rule learners and therefore capable
of adopting an abstract rule, namely win-stay lose-shift, that
could thereby be generalized across sets of new discriminations
(Wilson et al., 1985). If the pigeon NCL is functionally equivalent
to the primate PFC, or at least the dorsolateral PFC, thenwhat do
we expect the corvid NCL neurons to do? As mentioned in the
first section, the work on pigeons suggests that in working mem-
ory tasks the NCL neurons display their strongest responses in
the delay period, coding an expectation of reward (Rose and Co-
lombo, 2005). Similar studies to those on pigeons have recently
been performed on carrion crows. Neurons in the crow NCL
respond during the delay period of Delayed Matching and
Non-Matching to Sample Tasks (Veit and Nieder, 2013). Interest-
ingly in these tasks, the crows use an abstract rule (match or
non-match) using an arbitrary tone or shape presented in the
delay period. Veit and Nieder (2013) found that a population of
neurons in NCL fired in the delay period before the crows were
presented with their choice stimuli and so encoded the proper-
ties of these abstract rules. Some neurons also fired if the
crow was going to make a behavioral error, with a weaker or in-
verse discharge rate. Other neurons in the crow NCL continued
to respond to a previously presented visual stimulus during the
delay period of a working memory task even though the stimulus
was no longer present, suggesting that the image was being re-
tained in working memory before the crow had to make a behav-
ioral choice (Veit et al., 2014).
The second concerns the use of neuroimaging methods in
corvids. Marzluff and colleagues (2012) examined the brain re-
sponses of anaesthetized crows in a PET scanner to the presen-
tation of threatening faces versus benign faces (predicting
food). Neural networks typically responsive to fear (to the threat-
ening faces) and motivation (to faces predicting the presenta-
tion of food) in mammalian brains were also found responsivein crow brains. It remains to be seen how sophisticated such
avian neuroimaging studies will become as scanner resolution
increases and techniques can be applied to awake rather than
anaesthetized birds (De Groof et al., 2013). We envisage a re-
naissance of avian neuroscience with the application of optoge-
netics, which can be used to disrupt activity in selective neural
circuits with the application of focused light. This technique has
started to be used in zebra finches to study vocal learning (Rob-
erts et al., 2012); however, it could be adapted to our corvid
models. For example, it would be fascinating to investigate
the role of the hippocampus in both episodic-like memory for
past caching events and the jay’s ability to plan for tomorrow’s
breakfast. Would disruption of the corvid hippocampus and
NCL inhibit both of these abilities, as one would predict from hu-
man neurocognitive imagining studies and a recent comparative
analysis in animals (Allen and Fortin, 2013)? This is an important
question because although it has been well established that the
hippocampus plays a crucial role in spatial memory in both birds
and mammals, and that lesions to the hippocampus disrupt
memory for caches in food-storing birds including corvids
(e.g., Krushinskya, 1966), recent work on the neuroanatomy of
the pigeon hippocampus suggests that it only receives visual
and olfactory input. Rattenborg and Martinez-Gonzalez (2011)
have therefore argued that in contrast to the mammalian hippo-
campus the avian hippocampus does not have connections
with most higher-order association areas (but see Allen and
Fortin, 2013 for a counterargument in favor of evolutionary con-
tinuity). Studies of corvid connectivity would be crucial in this
regard.
Child Development
The second application of corvid models is for studying the
development of cognition in young humans. For example, we
can investigate whether, and to what extent, young children
show the same pattern of development in their performance on
what-where-and-when tasks inspired by the scrub-jay caching
to that found in other tests of mental time travel (reviewed by
Clayton, 2015). Performance on what-where-and-when memory
tests does indeed show a similar developmental trajectory (e.g.,
Hayne and Imuta, 2011; Scarf et al., 2013), namely that young
children generally fail the tasks at 3 years of age, show a transi-
tional state of performance at 4 years of age, and pass at 5 years
of age. Similarly, when children were tested on a task analogous
to the planning for breakfast experiment for scrub-jays, in which
the children were given the opportunity to plan for tomorrow’s
playtime as opposed to breakfast, they did not pass the task until
they were 4 years of age (Atance et al., 2015). In essence, the
children’s performance on the scrub-jay based paradigms
shows a similar developmental trajectory to that found in other
tests of episodic cognition in young children, thereby establish-
ing them as appropriate models for studying human and avian
cognition.
Corvid models of insightful problem solving have also been
adapted to study cognitive development, and such studies
show that these abilities develop surprisingly late in childhood.
Indeed, studies investigating the hook-making abilities of young
children suggest that it is not until children reach about 8 years of
age that they can solve such tasks, and even then, only about
half of the children were successful on the task (e.g., CuttingNeuron 86, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1339
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tory for hook-making abilities, young children did not pass the
critical aspects of the water task, such as spontaneously drop-
ping objects that sink into the tube as opposed to those that float
until they were 8 years of age (Cheke et al., 2012).
What Do the Corvid Analogs Tell Us about Human
Cognition?
Intuitively, onemight have thought that social and episodic cogni-
tion tasks required more complex forms of cognitive process
given that they both require forms of perspective taking (other
mindsandother times respectively). Perhaps the fact that children
pass these tasks earlier than the physical problem-solving tasks is
a reflection of the effects of extensive technological enculturation
onphysical problemsolving. Forexample, inWesternmechanistic
societies, children gain considerable experience of devices with
hidden mechanisms, from smart phones and computers to light
switches. Itwouldbe fascinating toconduct cross-cultural studies
to investigate these issues further. Suchcomparisonswould allow
us to investigate whether, and to what extent, a child’s under-
standing of the physical world is in general developmentally de-
layed compared to that of perspective taking andwhether this ap-
plies specifically to children who have been raised in mechanized
cultures. In doing so,we should gain a better understanding of the
mechanismscontrolling the variousbehavioral decisions that chil-
dren make in problem-solving tasks, including how they bring to
mind and coordinate the various actions required of the more
complex physical tasks involved in the hook manufacture tests
(Cutting et al., 2014). The hope is that these models will stimulate
future research to identify these cognitivemilestones and explore
the mechanisms underlying these abilities in both children and
corvids (Clayton, 2015).Conclusions
Our understanding of corvid cognition, especially with respect
to abilities thought to be uniquely human, has not been reflected
in our understanding of corvid neurobiology. In the 10 years
since our general understanding of the avian brain was reas-
sessed, we still know little about those birds that would make
plausible models for human cognition, namely corvids and par-
rots. We propose that neuroscientists interested in the neurobi-
ology of complex cognition start to incorporate avianmodels into
their paradigms, most effectively by collaborating with compar-
ative psychologists, ethologists, and behavioral ecologists with
expertise in working with these unusual species. Computational
neuroscientists will be able to think clearly about the issues sur-
rounding differences in neural and cognitive systems between
birds and mammals that will make the best use of data resulting
from these interdisciplinary relationships.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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